Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Preface
- Glossary
- List of Abbreviations
- Editorial Points Including Notes on Referencing
- 1 Introduction and Theoretical Considerations
- 2 Early Days
- 3 Dorojatun Becomes Sultan
- 4 The Japanese Occupation
- 5 Revolution–First Phase
- 6 Revolution–The Dutch Attack and Aftermath
- 7 The Problems of Independence
- 8 The End of Guided Democracy and the Rise of the New Order
- 9 Hamengku Buwono in the New Order
- 10 Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
9 - Hamengku Buwono in the New Order
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2018
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Preface
- Glossary
- List of Abbreviations
- Editorial Points Including Notes on Referencing
- 1 Introduction and Theoretical Considerations
- 2 Early Days
- 3 Dorojatun Becomes Sultan
- 4 The Japanese Occupation
- 5 Revolution–First Phase
- 6 Revolution–The Dutch Attack and Aftermath
- 7 The Problems of Independence
- 8 The End of Guided Democracy and the Rise of the New Order
- 9 Hamengku Buwono in the New Order
- 10 Conclusions
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
Summary
After the political/economic statement of April 1966, Hamengku Buwono's standing was as high as it had ever been. His humiliation at the hands of Sukarno in 1952 was a distant memory and the discrediting of Sukarno's economic mismanagement looked like a belated vindication of Sukarno's long-standing critics. Hamengku Buwono occupied important posts in the New Order for the next twelve years, including the vice presidency from 1973 to 1977, but became, surprisingly, less and less prominent and influential. His public statements became fewer, Suharto consulted him less, and he seemed increasingly isolated from the decision-making process. The more senior his position became, the more obscure his role seemed to be. The probable reasons for this are outlined inter alia in this chapter.
The MPRS session in June 1966 reconfirmed the March Letter of Instruction (Supersemar), removed Sukarno's title of President for Life, rejected Sukarno's first attempt to explain his role in the 30 September Affair and demanded further information, reconfirmed Suharto's ban on the PKI, and approved the ending of Confrontation against Malaysia.
The results of the session varied for each leading personality. Suharto's influence had clearly increased as Sukarno was cut down to size. Some observers thought, accurately as it turned out, that the popular Nasution had been sidelined, despite his elevation to the constitutionally important MPRS chairmanship. Malik kept in the background, but, having just negotiated the Bangkok agreement, his star remained bright. For Hamengku Buwono, the results were equivocal. Complaints were heard of a lack of dynamism, even accompanied by rumours that he might be removed in the next cabinet reshuffle. The Australian Embassy reported, “The Sultan has fared less well [than Malik]. His personal status is still untouched, but there is obvious ill-ease [sic] at his lack of drive.” Such comments were never made public but were beginning to be heard in private.
Meanwhile, his reputation based on his conduct during the Revolution, his general air of being above politics, and his steady and sober image somehow made him almost unassailable in public discourse. The process seems to have been a gradual one, but by the late 1960s it became unimaginable that anyone could say or write in public anything critical of him.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- A Prince in a RepublicThe Life of Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta, pp. 269 - 303Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2014