A few months after the EU membership referendum, governments in London, Edinburgh and elsewhere are still struggling to find a way through the mess that an ill-considered referendum and a notably mendacious campaign have created. In so doing they should most obviously pursue the national interest, but partisan interests remain on the agenda in both London and Edinburgh. This chapter offers advice to both the UK and Scottish governments, and focuses particularly on the challenge the vote has produced to the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom.

WHAT THE VOTE MEANS, AND WHAT IT DOESN’T MEAN

The Leave vote was as much protest as proposition, like the campaign which promoted it. It cannot be ignored, but it must also be understood. Support for leaving the EU was strong among those, especially older voters, long suspicious of European entanglements and influence, but also among economically disadvantaged communities and poorer people. Together they (just) added up to a majority. There is a striking resemblance to the Scottish independence referendum. Not just that both were nationalist in tone, though Brexiteers were for “taking back control”, while “decisions about Scotland taken by the people who care most about Scotland” was the SNP’s best argument, but in the composition of the vote. In Scotland, long-standing nationalist support, ideologically committed to leaving the UK, was supplemented by the votes of those who thought the present economic and constitutional setup did not serve their interests and had left them behind (e.g. see Curtice 2014); they thought change could make things no worse for them, and were told it would make them better. Similarly, in the European referendum those with a long-standing ideological opposition to or discomfort with Europe were bolstered by a group of voters whose alienation from the political process and dissatisfaction with their economic situation made them receptive to a message that with one bound they would be free. Voters who think things can’t get worse are not persuaded by warnings of risk. The relative proportions of voters in each case is the subject of reasonable argument, but in both a substantial share of the vote for change was a negative, dissatisfaction with the status quo – and that’s what delivered the narrow Brexit majority, not endorsement of a particular plan for the UK’s international status.