INTRODUCTION

Politics is about choice. It is therefore hardly surprising that political parties, still the central actor in most parliamentary democracies, frequently incur situations in which they need to make hard choices – choices between office, votes, and policies (Strøm 1990). Under specific conditions, however, parties may find themselves able to reach all three goals to a satisfactory degree, even if at the outset the strategy that allows them to do so may look risky. This chapter is concerned with such a case. The analysis of the developments that led to the breakup of the Social–Liberal coalition on 17 September 1982 shows that the FDP, conceptualized as a unitary actor, was confronted with a strategic choice in which most of the benefits in the end clearly lay with only one of the feasible courses of action, namely, the decision to leave the Social–Liberal coalition under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and form a new government with the Christian Democratic parties. The subsequent account shows that the Free Democrats (FDP) was in a uniquely favourable position that ultimately allowed it to maximize office, votes, and, within limits, policy influence at the same time. Yet, this was a risky strategy ex ante, and the short-term costs could have been substantial, particularly if the party had been forced to face the electorate shortly after its defection.

There was a price, however, which demonstrates the importance of accounting for intraorganizational constraints: Party unity was severely disrupted, particularly among leadership circles. The party leaders responsible for this decision survived, but they were certainly bloodied.