In the literature related to corporate participation in public policies, the case of France is often considered as an exception. French so-called resistance to consultants is often put down to the organisation of its senior civil service around Grands Corps. It is the very existence of these prestigious bodies deemed to show resistance to any kind of competitors coming from the private sector which would explain the fact that corporate actors are less present in the public sector than in other countries (Saint-Martin, 2000a; 2000b). This thesis conceals the growth of ‘consultocracy’ (Hood and Jackson, 1991, 224) in France since the beginning of the 2000s, but it also artificially opposes two groups: corporate actors on the one side and public ones on the other, which are both supposed to protect the price and the legitimacy of their own expertise. A close sociological study of their training, trajectories and careers shows that they are much more intermingled and similar than the common picture seems to indicate. Being in a sociological position of homology, many consultants and high civil servants in France have common interests, speak alike, share the same values and follow similar careers (Gervais, 2012). This paper summarises the main steps which contributed to consultants’ increasing deployment in French public policies and seeks to describe the type of service they aim to deliver, as well as what decision-makers may consider as their ‘added-value’. It argues that a critical part of their increasing deployment within French public policies and administrative reforms relies on their legitimising effects over change. By doing so, it highlights the national variations at stake in terms of their involvement and the extent to which they have an impact on the French public sector.

The consultant: the new state expert icon

French nineteenth-century experts belonged to a clearly defined and bounded world, and were closely linked to academia and the scientific field. They derived their social recognition, credibility and legitimacy from their scientific knowledge (Berrebi-Hoffmann and Lallement, 2009). In sharp contrast with these nineteenth-century characters, today's experts work for corporate firms, devise performance targets and set efficiency savings programmes. This shift occurred during the late twentieth-century in France, when state reform expertise moved from the field of intellectuals and academics to that of consultants and think tanks (Berrebi-Hoffmann and Gremion, 2009).