Anyone familiar with American nightly newscasts has likely listened as a witness provides some degree of background information concerning either the alleged perpetrator of a particular crime or some insight concerning the background of the victims. In most of these accounts, particularly when the crime in question has occurred in an area not “normally recognized” or identified by such behavior, the notion of surprise or shock is often prominently discussed. Statements such as, “This type of behavior may happen elsewhere, but it doesn't happen here,” or “He was such a quiet guy, it's hard to believe that he could have done such a horrible thing.” What such observations reveal is the socially constructed belief concerning not only the designated place where this type of behavior is exclusively expected to occur, but the type of individual likely to be involved—an individual who is clearly identified as “not like me” (Gordon, 2013).Recall from Chapter One that Trayvon Martin becomes “recognized” by George Zimmerman as a criminal based on a type of incongruence that emerges between individual presence and social place. Martin's presence becomes a “problem” for Zimmerman given that this type of social visibility is viewed as being “out of place” or “suspicious” with what would be “normally” anticipated or excepted. Much like the hypothetical scenario discussed above, the experience of surprise or threat reflects the immediacy of a disruptive incongruence between what is expected and what has imposed itself on one's immediate frame of reference. From this perspective, one's understanding of the social world becomes framed by a set of contextually situated taken-for-granted expectations that are constructed or recognized as being most consistent or normal to that locality. Perhaps stated slightly differently, the structural contours of a given social context are implicated in the construction and meaning of social visibility as it encounters the social world (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973). The above descriptions evoke what Schutz (1932/72) has described as the motivational phenomenology located within the face-to-face relationship.