The editors of this volume have kindly asked me to share some thoughts on a topic that has occupied most of my professional life, namely international economic interdependence and cooperation. The gist of these thoughts – which I have developed through multiple experiences in the fields of central banking and policymaking – is the fallacy of the “house in order” precept as an adequate rule to deal with the policy issues raised by economic interdependence. I reiterate: “as an adequate rule to deal with interdependence” and not “as a desirable precept per se.”

Compared to the general title of this volume, my comments have a broader scope and a narrower focus. A broader scope because I refer to “international policy” in general, not to “central banks” only. The intention here is not to avoid being specific about central banks, but rather to place central bank cooperation in the only context in which – I think – it can be properly approached.

The focus is, however, narrower because I concentrate on the philosophy, or perhaps the ideology, of interdependence and cooperation, not on its technicalities or its analytics. Cooperation is the word chosen by the editors of this volume. Coordination is an equally common term used in the literature, which, surprisingly, lacks a rigorous and agreed glossary in this field. To elaborate, a taxonomy would be a task in itself.