Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What Is the Problem?
- 3 The People and Popular Sovereignty. Back to Basics, and Onward …
- 4 The Nationalization of the People
- 5 Fantasies and Paradoxes of Populism
- 6 Myths and Misconceptions
- 7 Sweden-Intransigent Moralities at War in the Peopleâs Home
- 8 Catalonia-Toward a State Truly Our Own!
- 9 Hungary-Righteous Revenge for Historic Humiliations
- 10 Brexit-Between Despair and Delusion
- 11 The United States-Normalizing a Superpower by Abnormal Means
- 12 Extractions and Perspectives
- References
- Index
7 - Sweden-Intransigent Moralities at War in the Peopleâs Home
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 April 2020
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 What Is the Problem?
- 3 The People and Popular Sovereignty. Back to Basics, and Onward …
- 4 The Nationalization of the People
- 5 Fantasies and Paradoxes of Populism
- 6 Myths and Misconceptions
- 7 Sweden-Intransigent Moralities at War in the Peopleâs Home
- 8 Catalonia-Toward a State Truly Our Own!
- 9 Hungary-Righteous Revenge for Historic Humiliations
- 10 Brexit-Between Despair and Delusion
- 11 The United States-Normalizing a Superpower by Abnormal Means
- 12 Extractions and Perspectives
- References
- Index
Summary
A moral superpower feels an obligation to tell the world what to do, and how. For this task, it considers itself exceptionally and uniquely qualified. (Ann- Sofie Dahl 2006)
The lead question for this chapter can best be phrased as follows: Why do Swedish mainstream political parties refuse to cooperate with the populist Sweden Democrats (SD)? The answer is more complex than appears at first sight.
Most readers will undoubtedly be familiar with the outlines of and status for the Swedish dilemma, namely that the political consensus since the 1970s in this Scandinavian country, favoring open borders and a multicultural society, has become increasingly challenged by the populist SD, which attracts increasing numbers of supporters, and voters as well, and that this showdown has now (early 2019) landed the country in a political stalemate, since the mainstream parties categorically refuse to cooperate with SD in any shape or form, but on the other hand have had great difficulties reaching an agreement on government among themselves.
At this point in time, therefore, democracy in Sweden is facing an unprecedented and seemingly insoluble problem. Anarchy is a real threat, although the caretaker Social Democratic government obviously keeps the wheels turning, but no new policies can be implemented and no new laws passed. This quandary is not unlike the German situation, but is totally dissimilar from Norway, Finland and, not least, Denmark— all of them Nordic countries that have allowed populist parties to have a say in political affairs and where most of the other parties have, to significant extents, adopted populist attitudes and policies too. Why is Sweden so different, what explains what is effectively a case of Swedish exceptionalism? And does the answer lie exclusively in the field of immigration (which since 2015– 16 has brought the situation to a head), or do other factors play a role as well?
If we start by contextualizing the situation vis- à- vis “normal” nationalism in Europe, there is little doubt that the template in the region has called for the Gellnerian compact between one state and one homogeneous nation to be applied universally, in order for this sovereign unity to create trust, loyalty and welfare, both horizontally and vertically, within clearly defined borders. Sweden originally (i.e., in the interwar and postwar period) fully complied with this “model.”
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Paradoxes of PopulismTroubles of the West and Nationalism's Second Coming, pp. 83 - 98Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2020