Bismarck's wars with Austria and the greater part of the German Confederation (1866) and with France (1870-71) led to German unification. The army that had decided the outcome of these wars was the army of the so-called Roon Reform, carried out between 1859 and 1863. It is no exaggeration to argue that the army reform was pushed through by Wilhelm, prince regent since 1858 and king since 1861, Albrecht von Roon as minister of war, and Bismarck, using procedures that dragged the country into its greatest political and constitutional crisis since the revolutionary era (1848-50).

After the wars, there was a widespread belief in Germany that during the constitutional conflict, the army, by being steadfast and farsighted, had laid the foundation of the Empire, thus fulfilling the dream of the German people. Today, we have many reasons to doubt the existence of such a red line in Prussia's policy and German history. There is, of course, a connection between army reform and German unification, because there is an obvious nexus between reform and military successes. This is not to say that the reformers did not expect political gains by improving the army's strength and organization. But one can infer from these leaders' expectations that they pursued rather general ideas about strengthening Prussia's position in Germany and, of course, the monarchic order at home.