Philosophers of criminal law who work within the retributive tradition have focused on the question of whether and how state punishment is justified. These penal theorists have said relatively little, however, about the kinds or modes or types of punishment (I will use these terms interchangeably) that should be utilized. Contemporary states execute, imprison, fine, place on probation, conditionally discharge, caution, and do a great deal more to the persons they convict. What general principles govern how states should choose between the foregoing responses to culpable wrongdoing - or select an altogether different type of sanction? If my reasoning is sound, it is easy to understand why retributivists have tended to neglect this issue. They have neglected it because they have little to contribute to its resolution. In what follows, I will support this conclusion and discuss a few of the somewhat controversial positions on which it rests. I hope to make some headway on this topic by defending what I call the "deferential view about kinds of punishment" (or "deferential view" for short).