Preface

I.

It is our custom to treat the philosophy of the eighteenth century as the true and lineal ancestor of philosophy in our own time. We are perhaps mistaken, however, in imagining the terms and practices of contemporary philosophy to have been set in the principles of eighteenth-century, as opposed, let us say, to nineteenthcentury philosophy. If we have been mistaken in identifying the sources of our practices, we at least have not been scandalously mistaken. It were natural enough for a modern thinker to conceive that his principles were derived from ancient thinkers and principles. In spite of eighteenth-century thought's obsession with the war between the ancients and the moderns, I suggest reconsidering its foundations, in which reconsideration I quite consciously if obtusely treat the distinction between ancients and moderns as an open question.121

While this reconsideration is fit for a general project, I am interested in it via the medium of a quite specific work, within a very narrow genre. This is a clue to guide us. For surely the ready recourse to moral fable in the eighteenth century contrasts sharply with any approach any contemporary philosopher is likely to adopt. Further, the claim that such fables might be a vehicle for the development of philosophical principles is in our time contrary to our intuitions. It is no accident, doubtless, that apart from Rousseau's Emile the fictions and other romantic creations of serious writers from the eighteenth century and after receive short shrift from biographers, philosophers, and historians. The Temple de Gnide by Montesquieu is no exception. Like many of his other fables, this one generally attracts patronizing praise of its workmanship and neglect of its content.

I believe that a strong case can be made to interpret the Temple de Gnide philosophically—as with all Montesquieu's fables. Further, I believe that such an interpretation will establish non-hackneyed principles of philosophical and political analysis that identify eighteenth-century thought on grounds which differ radically from those which prevail in our time and thus stand in a different relation to ancient thought than we may imagine. That is why I offer an English translation of the Temple de Gnide and a brief commentary on it. First, however, I have chosen to establish the context within which this analysis takes place by reconstituting the language and the problem as they were viewed in the eighteenth century by David Hume.