Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- 1 On Whose Shoulders? German Rearmament and the Cold War Burden
- 2 The British “New Look” and Anglo-German Relations
- 3 Adenauer and “Perfidious Albion”: Troop Reductions, Support Costs, and the Integration of Europe, 1957-1959
- 4 The Radford Plan: America and Its Troops in Germany, 1955-1958
- 5 The Political Economy of U.S. Troop Stationing in Europe
- 6 Offset and Monetary Policy During the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1962
- 7 The Bargain Slowly Unravels: Offset, Troop Reductions, and the Balance of Payments, 1962-1965
- 8 The Culmination of the Burden-Sharing Conflict: Chancellor Erhard’s Visit to Washington in September 1966
- 9 The Trilateral Negotiations of 1966-1967
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - The Radford Plan: America and Its Troops in Germany, 1955-1958
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 January 2013
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- 1 On Whose Shoulders? German Rearmament and the Cold War Burden
- 2 The British “New Look” and Anglo-German Relations
- 3 Adenauer and “Perfidious Albion”: Troop Reductions, Support Costs, and the Integration of Europe, 1957-1959
- 4 The Radford Plan: America and Its Troops in Germany, 1955-1958
- 5 The Political Economy of U.S. Troop Stationing in Europe
- 6 Offset and Monetary Policy During the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1962
- 7 The Bargain Slowly Unravels: Offset, Troop Reductions, and the Balance of Payments, 1962-1965
- 8 The Culmination of the Burden-Sharing Conflict: Chancellor Erhard’s Visit to Washington in September 1966
- 9 The Trilateral Negotiations of 1966-1967
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
During the 1950s the American GIs in Germany were, in sharp contrast to the controversies surrounding the British troop commitment from 1955 onward, not a source of serious conflict between stationing and host countries - apart from one significant episode, which forms the subject of this chapter. Within a few years after the end of World War II, the American military presence became an integral feature of the European postwar settlement. Divergences on their military and political roles were usually fought out in internal strategic debates that did not significantly affect troop levels. This relative calm and stability does not indicate, however, that in U.S. government circles preoccupations similar to British ideas were nonexistent. On the contrary, the principle of a seemingly unlimited presence of its troops in Europe was never accepted by the American government as a whole nor by Congress and the American public. However, in the absence of powerful financial counterarguments, such as balance-of-payments problems, the political arguments for an undiminished commitment to the defense of Europe carried the day in discussions within the government. This changed only in 1959 and 1960, when the American dollar came under pressure just as the English pound had.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Money and SecurityTroops, Monetary Policy, and West Germany's Relations with the United States and Britain, 1950–1971, pp. 87 - 96Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2002