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On Argument

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Summary

Many a time have I been present, when in consequence of singular, but inadvertent associations, two persons have been engaged in an argument, or rather perhaps were approaching towards it, without being at all aware of the circumstance. And, I have often observed at those times, that one, or perhaps both, instead of answering directly to what has been advanced, start off from the fair open path of the conversation, and break it up, or conclude it, by attributing foolish or improper opinions to the opponent; which are unwarrantably asserted, either by word or manner, to be not worth answering.

Now though we may expect of persons, who let their conversation run so irregularly as to get into an argument before they are aware of it, that they would treat it in a somewhat loose and immethodical manner, I know of no right, nor can I conceive of any, by which a person is entitled to call that foolish, false, or improper, which he cannot answer. It is easy to say Yes, and No, particularly when the speaker will assign no reasons to support his monosyllables; and it is easy to assume an appearance of sagacity and experience, and give unjust censure the dress which belongs only to correct criticism. It is also easy for a man to imagine that his own views of things, however partial and imperfect they may be, are right; but these facilities do not by any means make such modes and feelings just, nor is a man's wisdom increased in proportion to the good opinion he has of himself.

That every one has a right to enjoy his own opinion is allowed; but that any one may condemn the opinion of another is denied. Why should I borrow the reason of another, or place my own in subjection to it? Why should I go elsewhere for what nature has planted in my own breast?—I should be the very meanest of all beings, so to degrade my nature—but I should also be the most tyrannical of the human race, if I wished, and endeavoured, to make my opinion govern all others. For I am not entitled, ’though I have a mind within myself, to make other men, who also are supplied within, of my mind too.

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Michael Faraday’s Mental Exercises
An Artisan Essay-Circle in Regency London
, pp. 49 - 50
Publisher: Liverpool University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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