Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Technology and Warfare
- Chapter 2 The Emergence Of France
- Chapter 3 French Monarchical Power in Context
- Chapter 4 Warfare In France To 1066
- Chapter 5 A Clash Of Dynasties 1066– 1180
- Chapter 6 Philip Ii and The Rise of France
- Chapter 7 The Expansion of France
- Chapter 8 Louis Ix and The Apogee Of French Power
- Chapter 9 The Problems Of Power
- Chapter 10 Perspectives on The Army of The Kings of France
- Bibliography
- Appendix: A Note on Sources
- Index
Chapter 5 - A Clash Of Dynasties 1066– 1180
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 April 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Illustrations
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Technology and Warfare
- Chapter 2 The Emergence Of France
- Chapter 3 French Monarchical Power in Context
- Chapter 4 Warfare In France To 1066
- Chapter 5 A Clash Of Dynasties 1066– 1180
- Chapter 6 Philip Ii and The Rise of France
- Chapter 7 The Expansion of France
- Chapter 8 Louis Ix and The Apogee Of French Power
- Chapter 9 The Problems Of Power
- Chapter 10 Perspectives on The Army of The Kings of France
- Bibliography
- Appendix: A Note on Sources
- Index
Summary
The French Monarchy and the Anglo Norman State
BY THE LATER eleventh century the great principalities of France had largely become fixed items in the political landscape, and in theory they accepted that they were subject to the Capetian king. In practice the princes rarely attended the royal court, and the king’s relations with them were comparable (but not identical) to those with foreign powers, in that occasions of compelling mutual (and often opposed) interest would bring them together. As we have seen, the monarchy’s real focus had shrunk to between the Seine and Loire, and even there the rise of castellans meant that the king had to persuade rather than command. This condition affected all the principalities, however, and the king struggled to control those who owed him obedience. The more distant of the principalities ignored the monarchy almost totally. The dukes of Brittany were deeply concerned by aggression from Normandy and Anjou but had little to do with the monarchy. The counts of Toulouse and Gothia, especially under Raymond IV of St. Gilles, who absorbed the county of Provence and Arles, virtually ignored the Capetians. Burgundy, though ruled by a cadet branch of the Capetian house, was very aloof. By contrast, Blois Chartres to the west of the royal demesne, and Champagne to the east, both held by descendants of Herbert II of Vermandois, were intimately caught up with the monarchy. Flanders was a mighty power in the north, which marched with the Capetian sphere of influence. Ever menacing was the Anglo Norman realm to the west, so close to Paris.
None of these magnates, not even the Anglo Norman king, ever denied the position of the king of France, however, let alone threatened to overthrow the monarchy or any particular king. The problem was the ambiguities of political organization. The authority of kings was not so very different from that of princes— and, indeed, of lesser lords— for all could act as judges, raise armies, often mint coins, and make alliances with others. How this worked out in any particular case depended almost entirely on the particular political situation. The complexity of relationships was remarkable.
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- Information
- Medieval France at WarA Military History of the French Monarchy, 885-1305, pp. 73 - 112Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2022