Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Dedication
- Introduction
- Section 1 LOYALISM DEFINED
- 1 Antecedents: loyalty and disaffection in Ireland before 1789
- 2 The Brethren of Britons: the emergence of Irish counter-revolutionary loyalism, 1789–96
- 3 ‘The first up will carry the day’: the mobilisation and militarisation of Irish loyalism, 1796–8
- 4 Closing the ranks: loyalism monopolised, 1798–1805
- Section 2 LOYALISM IN LIMBO
- Section 3 LOYALISM, PROTESTANTISM AND POPULAR POLITICS
- Select bibliography
- Index
3 - ‘The first up will carry the day’: the mobilisation and militarisation of Irish loyalism, 1796–8
from Section 1 - LOYALISM DEFINED
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 September 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Dedication
- Introduction
- Section 1 LOYALISM DEFINED
- 1 Antecedents: loyalty and disaffection in Ireland before 1789
- 2 The Brethren of Britons: the emergence of Irish counter-revolutionary loyalism, 1789–96
- 3 ‘The first up will carry the day’: the mobilisation and militarisation of Irish loyalism, 1796–8
- 4 Closing the ranks: loyalism monopolised, 1798–1805
- Section 2 LOYALISM IN LIMBO
- Section 3 LOYALISM, PROTESTANTISM AND POPULAR POLITICS
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
The scale of conflict against Revolutionary and Napoleonic France necessitated the mobilisation and militarisation of civilians to an unprecedented degree, swamping all traditional emergency expedients like militia and making Britain an ‘armed nation’. Ireland was not exempt. By mid-1796, reports of an imminent invasion attempt forced Camden to grasp the nettle of home defence, despite his dread of renewed volunteering. Time was short. From the north came Thomas Knox's warning that the rapidly militarising revolutionaries made some scheme for ‘arming the loyalists’ urgently necessary as ‘the first up will carry the day’. From Camden's perspective there were two choices: armed Dungannon-type associations, which because of their lower and middle-class rank and file membership would tend to be infantry; or a mounted force of ‘respectables’ modelled on the English yeomanry. Both options would be under gentry and, ultimately, government control. However, given the fact that this would involve de facto delegation of power to the localities, Camden preferred a force of mounted gentlemen and substantial ‘yeoman’ farmers. Selected gentlemen were sent to the counties to assess opinion, but it was already common knowledge that some sort of force was to be raised and various individuals had canvassed opinion; loyal resolutions had been published and civilians offered service for home defence and anti-invasion duties.
The formal establishment of the Irish yeomanry in October 1796 subsumed the earlier loyal associations. Although the rationale for the creation of the force was primarily military and strategic, as yeomanry formation helped create and nurture loyalty, it can also be seen in the context of loyalist mobilisation. The procedure for raising and joining yeomanry corps bore many resemblances to the production of loyal declarations.
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- Information
- Loyalism in Ireland, 1789–1829 , pp. 70 - 96Publisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2007