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37 - Introduction

from Section 13

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 April 2020

By
Peter Zachar
Edited by
Kenneth S. Kendler ,
Josef Parnas  and
Peter Zachar
Kenneth S. Kendler
Affiliation:
Virginia Commonwealth University
Josef Parnas
Affiliation:
University of Copenhagen
Peter Zachar
Affiliation:
Auburn University, Montgomery
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Summary

One of the defining claims of so-called post-positivist approaches to the philosophy of science is that observation is theory-laden (Hanson, 1958; Kuhn, 1962). According to the strongest versions of this claim, theories do not just influence what we attend to, they actually influence what we observe – and people with different theoretical frameworks can look at the same stimuli, but observe different things. If correct, this undermines the notion that there is something called raw observation.

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Chapter
Information
Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology
Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives
 , pp. 459 - 461
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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References

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Kendler, K. S. (2019) ‘The genealogy of dementia praecox I: Signs and symptoms of delusional psychoses from 1880 to 1900.’ Schizophrenia Bulletin, 45, 296–304.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Kuhn, T. S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar

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