There had been intermittent crises in international relations since 1900, the most serious of which had been the 1912 Agadir dispute, but none had led to war. Many commentators believed that a major conflict between the European powers was unlikely ever to occur. It was in this context that the increased tension that followed the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by Serb and Croat nationalist rebels at the end of June 1914, was initially viewed. Few thought that the event would lead in less than a month to a general European war, let alone a conflict which would last for four years and transform the social, economic, political and international landscape in its wake. In its early days, the crisis was thus treated with relative complacency. It was only from the weekend of 1 August 1914 that the seriousness of the situation, and Britain's likely involvement, came to be realised. It took much longer for many politicians and commentators to accept that the conflict could drag on for years, rather than months. It was in an atmosphere of shock, horror and apprehension, as the full implications of the European situation slowly became apparent, that political and policy decisions were made. Politicians were forced to respond to events that they only partially understood, and which were, for the first three months of the war, extremely volatile. They tended to be led by events rather than taking the lead themselves, and their views on the situation shifted as more information became available or circumstances changed. No politicians, and particularly not the Labour leaders, were masters of the situation.