Frederick Rauscher considers Kant’s claim in the Collins lecture that "freedom is the inner worth of the world" (Collins 27:344) and argues against a realist interpretation of this assertion. On a realist conception, value would be a property of humanity independent of both the empirical moral agent and the transcendental conditions for moral agency as such. The chapter advances several arguments to show that such a value property either could not exist or would be unknowable to the moral agent. Rather than an intrinsic property, Rauscher argues that value is merely a formal ordering imposed by reason upon nature. To say that humanity has absolute value is simply to say that, in the order that pure practical reason imposes on the ends of rational agents, humanity has a higher place than any other end. Just as the value of contingent ends of empirical moral agents is simply their place in those agents’ subjective ordering of ends, so humanity as a necessary end for all rational agents is simply the place of humanity in pure practical reason’s objective ordering of ends.