The first part of this chapter is devoted to the question of how different modes of constitution-making shape the character of the constitution, prompting the question of how a peaceful transitional process from authoritarian to constitutional rule has influenced the character of the constitutions of those post-authoritarian transition countries. What has been called “transitional constitutionality” (László Sólyom) reveals the particularities that distinguish the role of constitutional courts in post-authoritarian societies from their corresponding institutions in established constitutional democracies. The second part addresses the puzzling experience of a widespread popular distrust in the positive function of constitutional democracy not only in established liberal democracies but also in recently constitutionalized post-authoritarian countries. My reflections focus on the observation that in our era of globalization the closed state – arguably an essential precondition of the functioning of an “open society” – is about to wane and metamorphose into an “open state.” Considerable portions of the population sense open statehood as a threat that deprives them of the control over their living conditions.