Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Managing states
- 2 Orchestrating policy implementation
- 3 Orchestration on a tight leash
- 4 Orchestration by design
- 5 Efficient orchestration?
- 6 Orchestrating monitoring
- 7 Orchestrating enforcement
- Part III Bypassing states
- Part IV Implications
- References
- Index
2 - Orchestrating policy implementation
EU governance through regulatory networks
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Managing states
- 2 Orchestrating policy implementation
- 3 Orchestration on a tight leash
- 4 Orchestration by design
- 5 Efficient orchestration?
- 6 Orchestrating monitoring
- 7 Orchestrating enforcement
- Part III Bypassing states
- Part IV Implications
- References
- Index
Summary
Abstract
Governance through EU regulatory networks is a compelling example of orchestration: the European Commission enlists regulatory networks as intermediaries to achieve regulatory governance goals, rather than pursuing these goals by itself. Our contribution addresses two key issues central to the orchestration framework. First, why does one of the most powerful regulatory authorities in international politics – the European Commission – opt for orchestration at all? Second, why do orchestration arrangements in the EU vary from very close to rather loose relations between orchestrator (Commission), intermediary (regulatory networks) and target (national regulatory authorities)? We draw on a set of case studies in two policy areas – competition and telecommunications policy – to explore the choice of orchestration over alternative governance arrangements as well as the design of orchestration arrangements, with loose or close network structures. Combining the capability deficit and goal divergence hypotheses, we show that in both areas orchestration was chosen because it was considered a functional solution to compensate for the Commission’s lack of operational capabilities to directly implement EU policies. Regarding network design, we demonstrate that persistent goal divergence in the field of telecommunications explains the resistance of EU member states to closer ties between the orchestrator (the Commission) and the intermediary (the regulatory network in the telecommunication sector), whereas goal convergence was a precondition for the Commission’s willingness to decentralize EU antitrust enforcement and establish close ties with the competition network.
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- International Organizations as Orchestrators , pp. 39 - 64Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015
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