Introduction

The United Nations' first ad hoc war crimes court – the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – seemed, unsurprisingly, destined to be mired in conflict with the Serbian and Croatian governments that had instigated the Balkan wars in the first place. But the UN's next attempt to establish an international tribunal, in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide, promised a much brighter future for cooperation with a state whose government leaders represented the victims. Whereas the ICTY was cast as a natural enemy of Serbs and Croats, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) seemed poised as a likely friend of the new Tutsi-led Rwandan government that brought the 1994 genocide to a halt and took power in its aftermath. The potential for a strong alliance between the Kigali government and the ICTR could be seen in the confluence of Rwandan government and international interests in prosecuting the Hutu architects of the genocide. Despite this convergence, the tribunal–government relationship was often marked by rancor and bitterness. From the start, the threat of state non-compliance loomed. Disagreement over the blueprint for the new court prompted Rwanda, which happened to hold a temporary seat on the Security Council at the time, to cast a dissenting vote against authorizing the establishment of the tribunal. Even after the authorization, tribunal officials and diplomats feared that Rwanda might withhold vital assistance and disrupt the court's work.