This volume aims to address, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, the following philosophical question: ‘How are we to understand other cultures?’ (hereafter, the question of intercultural understanding). In so doing, it brings into conversation Wittgensteinian and other cultural and philosophical traditions, stemming notably from Japan, China, the West African Yoruba people or India. The book is therefore not just about intercultural understanding; it also brings together, under the umbrella of Wittgensteinian philosophy, a plurality of cultural voices and philosophical cultures.

We set out to develop an approach to addressing the question of intercultural understanding that emphasizes the connection between its epistemological, ethical and political aspects. The Wittgensteinian tradition – spanning not only Ludwig Wittgenstein’s own corpus but also the work of other prominent and up-and-coming philosophers directly influenced by Wittgenstein – is ideally suited to this task. The contributions to this volume build on a wealth of Wittgensteinian strategies and methodologies to develop an imaginative, fresh portfolio of philosophical responses to the intercultural question, as well as strategies to address the special challenges it poses. The book is divided into two parts, each of which includes six chapters. Part I presents a series of new proposals on how best to model intercultural understanding after Wittgenstein. Part II examines a new set of challenges to intercultural understanding, stemming from relativism, the philosophy of disagreement and the problem of cultural exclusion, among others.

Constantine Sandis launches Part I with ‘Understanding Other Cultures (Without Mind-Reading)’. In this chapter, Sandis draws on the analogy with historical understanding to argue that understanding contemporary cultures that may appear alien to us involves a form of thinking with that does not require any agreement in opinion but, instead, a parallel sharing of thought processes. This idea is explored in relation to recent attempts to make sense of the ghost narratives that emerged in Japan in the aftermath of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami. Drawing partly from Wittgenstein and Clifford Geertz, Sandis suggests that understanding the thoughts of another culture is not a question of mind-reading but rather of conceptual immersion.

Chon Tejedor, in ‘Intercultural Understanding, Epistemic Interaction and Polyphonic Cultures’, revisits three central Wittgensteinian views: philosophy understood as an activity of interactively engaging with a real or imaginary interlocutor; nonsense as self-stultification; and perspicuous representation.