Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Map 1
- Map 2
- Map 3
- Map 4
- Map 5
- Map 6
- Map 7
- Map 8
- Introduction
- 1 The dominance of air and sea production
- 2 The air and sea war and the phases of equipment destruction
- 3 The air and sea war to November 1940
- 4 Grand strategists and the air and sea war
- 5 Understanding the air and sea war from December 1940 to March 1942
- 6 Grand strategy in action: prioritizing the air and sea war
- 7 Winning the shipping war
- 8 The war in Europe in 1943: strategic bombing and the land war
- 9 The war in Europe in 1944
- 10 The air and sea war against Japan, 1942–4
- 11 The end of the war
- Conclusion: the supremacy of air and sea power and the control of mobility
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
1 - The dominance of air and sea production
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 February 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgments
- List of Abbreviations
- Map 1
- Map 2
- Map 3
- Map 4
- Map 5
- Map 6
- Map 7
- Map 8
- Introduction
- 1 The dominance of air and sea production
- 2 The air and sea war and the phases of equipment destruction
- 3 The air and sea war to November 1940
- 4 Grand strategists and the air and sea war
- 5 Understanding the air and sea war from December 1940 to March 1942
- 6 Grand strategy in action: prioritizing the air and sea war
- 7 Winning the shipping war
- 8 The war in Europe in 1943: strategic bombing and the land war
- 9 The war in Europe in 1944
- 10 The air and sea war against Japan, 1942–4
- 11 The end of the war
- Conclusion: the supremacy of air and sea power and the control of mobility
- Notes
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
The German state-sponsored histories of World War II, published in English translation as Germany and the Second World War, are remarkable achievements of scholarship. Fair-minded and detailed, they present a thorough picture of Germany at war. In one of the sections on war production the authors seemed surprised that Germany's economic effort was geared much more towards aircraft production than land armaments. They then pose a question:
If it is true that the Second World War was ultimately decided on the battlefields of eastern Europe, by the clash of German and Soviet tank armies, then the question arises why the share of firepower and mobility of land forces was so conspicuously small in Germany.
It is a central question, but it is also misdirected in its assumptions. Instead of Germany spending a “conspicuously” small amount of effort on the land war, the Nazi state's efforts in this area were absolutely typical of all the major powers, with the exception of the Soviet Union. The economies of four of the five great industrial and technological powers that fought World War II were geared by large majorities towards the production of air and sea weapons. Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom (with the British Empire) and the United States all devoted between 65 percent and 80 percent of their economic output to the making and arming of aircraft, naval vessels and anti-aircraft equipment. In all cases aircraft were the single largest element of production, ranging from 30–35 percent of US munitions output to more than 50 percent in the case of the United Kingdom. When one adds the costs of developing and arming aircraft to the costs of constructing airframes and engines, these percentages jump to slightly below 50 percent for the United States and to more than half for Germany and the United Kingdom. In all, construction of air weapons also received first priority in the allocation of industrial workers and in being supplied with crucial raw materials such as aluminum. In many ways it is the allocation of aluminum that really shows the high priority given to the air war.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- How the War Was WonAir-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II, pp. 17 - 66Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015