A state is supposed to be strong and nimble to take full advantage of the accelerated flows of capital, goods, and information associated with the latest post-Cold War spurt of globalization, but few states in the MENA seem to be in the running. Those with the biggest armies and police are still premised on a Soviet–American order that no longer exists. Algeria and Iraq are autodestructing, and Egypt and Syria maintain unsustainable public sectors. These four leading Arab states of the 1960s are hardly alone in the region in bearing the burdens of dubious past economic achievements. More than a decade after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the MENA still has more state enterprise than most former communist regimes. The latter are labeled “transition economies” in the international lexicon of political economy, whereas few of the MENA countries even rate inclusion in the burgeoning case studies of Third World transitions to market economies (e.g. Haggard and Kaufman 1995: 17), some of which are included in our suggestions for further reading and research.

Israel, Tunisia, Turkey, Jordan, and Morocco have undergone substantial structural adjustment, however, and it is hardly coincidental that they, too, are the most active in forging agreements with the European Union and the World Trade Organization. They score highest on the intra-industry trade index and seem well positioned to further liberalize their trade and capital markets. Yet these early adjusters, like other states, are also constrained by their political and administrative capacities.