Introduction

If liberalism is committed to the individual and individual choice, it is also conventionally taken to be committed to freedom and equality. Giving effects to such principles often creates tensions: the “free” acts of individuals will sometimes produce inequality; and state enforcement of equality will likely reduce individual freedom. Beyond that, despite statutory – even constitutional – guarantees of equality, systemic slants lead to gendered inequalities that almost invariably subjugate or disempower women, either individually or collectively. When faced with the claims of subordinated groups, liberalism is asked to make concessions in which these collisions intensify and multiply. In fact, if the mandate to address the rights or interests of groups is not perfectly consistent with liberalism's commitment to individuals, such group accommodation may, however, be necessary if individuals in those groups are to be treated liberally – that is, accorded liberty or equality. And the mandate to address the subordination of groups generates new collisions between liberty and equality: de facto freedom for subordinated groups may require their specific regulation, while equality of their members may require active distributions in their favor. The “politics of recognition” invoked by subordinated groups within liberalism is thus an inherently contradictory project, exposing in practice the ideals of liberty and equality as fundamentally paradoxical.