Almost ten years ago, ethnic Chinese became the systematic target and victims of mass rioting. Even if the May ’98 riots were incited by as yet unidentified “provocateurs”, they would not have developed so intensely and so quickly if there were no underlying anti Chinese sentiment among the masses. More than 10,000 were killed, including non-Chinese; primarily ethnic Chinese women were gang-raped; and losses of around US$187.5 million were incurred, but to this day no decisive action has been taken to follow up on reports and calls for accountability by the Indonesian Human Rights Commission and other NGOs. The authorities’ disinterest in finding out the truth behind the riots only gives credence to the perception that the Chinese are dispensable.

Hence, to be able to begin to resolve the problem of the Chinese in Indonesia, we have to first accept the fact that there remains some ambivalence on how the non-Chinese and Chinese respond to each other. One cannot help but agree with social scientist, Dr Thung Yulan, who believes that “the recognition of the existence of the identity of ‘Chineseness’ of the ethnic Chinese is the necessary first step to take”, in any attempt to accept the ethnic Chinese as part of the Indonesian make-up. So far, the pribumi have only been able to do this very reluctantly.

The study of ethnic relations in Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto is now certainly more interesting, if not equally complicated. Whereas previously all talk on matters related to “SARA”, namely ethnicity, religion, race, and inter-group differences, was repressed, in the current era of Reformasi it is a free-for-all: anyone can say anything about everything, including subjects that were once considered divisive and dangerous. In the post-Soeharto era of openness and freedom of expression, the pent-up primordial sentiments lurking ominously behind Indonesia's “unity” of ethnic diversity and religious fervour are let loose. Therefore, we are faced not only with the problem of continuing tension between ethnic Chinese and non-Chinese, but also of inter-group and intra-group ethnic tension and religious intolerance, such as what we have painfully witnessed in Maluku, in Poso, between the Maduranese and the Javanese, for example. On top of this, there is the problem of economic hardship and gaping socio-economic inequality.