Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The place of normative theory in international relations
- 2 Sceptical and realist arguments against normative theory in international relations: a critical appraisal
- 3 Normative issues in international relations: the domain of discourse and the method of argument
- 4 Towards the construction of a normative theory of international relations
- 5 Reconciling rights and sovereignty: the constitutive theory of individuality
- 6 The justification of unconventional violence in international relations: a hard case for normative theory
- 7 Who gets what state where? The Bosnian conflict
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE STUIDES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
5 - Reconciling rights and sovereignty: the constitutive theory of individuality
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 September 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 The place of normative theory in international relations
- 2 Sceptical and realist arguments against normative theory in international relations: a critical appraisal
- 3 Normative issues in international relations: the domain of discourse and the method of argument
- 4 Towards the construction of a normative theory of international relations
- 5 Reconciling rights and sovereignty: the constitutive theory of individuality
- 6 The justification of unconventional violence in international relations: a hard case for normative theory
- 7 Who gets what state where? The Bosnian conflict
- Conclusion
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
- CAMBRIDGE STUIDES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Summary
Introduction
I am attempting to construct a background theory which justifies the list of goods currently accepted as settled in international relations. I considered order-based justifications and utilitarian justifications and found them both wanting. I then turned to rights-based theories which used the notion of contract and found that such theories held promise with regard to the justification of several of the items on the list of settled norms. Most obviously it seemed plausible enough to suppose that a rights-based theory would justify the settled norm referring to democratic institutions within states, the settled norm which required that states be both internally and externally concerned with the protection of human rights, and the settled norm asserting that international law is a good thing. However, I argued that at first glance it seemed rather improbable to suppose that the settled norm referring to the preservation of the system of states and the norm establishing that state sovereignty is a good could be justified by a rights-based background theory. There seemed to be a basic tension between those norms concerned with the preservation of the system of states and sovereignty on the one hand, and those norms related to individual human rights on the other. It seemed that human rights norms were best seen as setting limits to the ambit of the sovereignty-related norms, rather than as justifying those norms.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ethics in International RelationsA Constitutive Theory, pp. 137 - 159Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1996