Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Dramatis Personae
- Chronology
- Stemma: The Tetrarchic Dynasty, 284–311
- Abbreviations
- Introduction: A Military Regime in the Third Century ad
- 1 Band of Brothers: Diocletian and Maximian, Virtutibus Fratres
- 2 Gang of Four: The Tetrarchy Begins
- 3 Diocletian vs Heredity: Succession Events and the Soldiery
- 4 A Tale of Two Princes: Constantine and Maxentius before 306
- 5 Invisible Feminae and Galerian Empresses: The Representation of Imperial Women
- Conclusions: Domus Militaris
- Appendix: Prosopography of the Imperial Women
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - A Tale of Two Princes: Constantine and Maxentius before 306
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 August 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Dramatis Personae
- Chronology
- Stemma: The Tetrarchic Dynasty, 284–311
- Abbreviations
- Introduction: A Military Regime in the Third Century ad
- 1 Band of Brothers: Diocletian and Maximian, Virtutibus Fratres
- 2 Gang of Four: The Tetrarchy Begins
- 3 Diocletian vs Heredity: Succession Events and the Soldiery
- 4 A Tale of Two Princes: Constantine and Maxentius before 306
- 5 Invisible Feminae and Galerian Empresses: The Representation of Imperial Women
- Conclusions: Domus Militaris
- Appendix: Prosopography of the Imperial Women
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
During the time of the First Tetrarchy, the future must have appeared stark, even perilous, for the imperial sons. The first-ranking Augustus Diocletian did not wish for them to succeed, and their own fathers were bending to the will of their auctor imperii. From the Flavian period until 293, biological sons, when available, had taken pride of place in co-option and succession. But the failure to co-opt Maxentius in 293 had marked a change, and in the years leading up to 305, the Tetrarchs must have come to the understanding that they would not co-opt their sons upon the abdication of the Augusti. The princes must have wondered what would happen to them once the Augusti were no longer in power, and especially once their fathers had passed on. Norms dictated that they should succeed. Without their fathers to protect them, how safe would they be from the machinations of future emperors wishing to protect themselves from an ambitious prince? Indeed, the murders of Candidianus, Severianus and Maximus by Licinius following the death of Maximinus morbidly illustrates this reality. For many, succession would have appeared a matter of life and death.
Consequently, this problem facing the sons was a problem for Diocletian as well as Galerius, the succession’s primary beneficiary. While Diocletian appears to have had little confidence in the ability of the princes to win a strong and lasting military following, he must have realised that a discontented son could still cause problems. Any seizure of power, no matter how fleeting, was of course not in the interests of a regime, and if a son led that putsch, not only would it have undermined the image of Tetrarchic concordia, but the prince’s defeat and death would have provoked tensions within the imperial leadership. The situation begs several questions. First and foremost, how did Diocletian attempt to handle the sons? How did he seek to keep them subdued, and did he treat them in ways that befitted a prince? Moreover, did the individual princes have different experiences? What do their experiences tell us about the intentions and ambitions of the individual Tetrarchs? And what do their experiences suggest about how the imperial college functioned? In considering these questions, this chapter will focus on Constantine and Maxentius, on whom we have the most information.
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- Dynastic Politics in the Age of Diocletian, AD 284-311 , pp. 166 - 196Publisher: Edinburgh University PressPrint publication year: 2022