Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Drones on the Ground
- Part II Drones and the Laws of War
- Part III Drones and Policy
- 11 “Bring on the Magic”
- 12 The Five Deadly Flaws of Talking About Emerging Military Technologies and the Need for New Approaches to Law, Ethics, and War
- 13 Drones and Cognitive Dissonance
- 14 Predator Effect
- 15 Disciplining Drone Strikes
- 16 World of Drones
- Part IV Drones and the Future of War
- Index
11 - “Bring on the Magic”
Using Drones in Afghanistan
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- Part I Drones on the Ground
- Part II Drones and the Laws of War
- Part III Drones and Policy
- 11 “Bring on the Magic”
- 12 The Five Deadly Flaws of Talking About Emerging Military Technologies and the Need for New Approaches to Law, Ethics, and War
- 13 Drones and Cognitive Dissonance
- 14 Predator Effect
- 15 Disciplining Drone Strikes
- 16 World of Drones
- Part IV Drones and the Future of War
- Index
Summary
As a Special Forces commander in Afghanistan, I used drones in a variety of ways – from the Raven, literally a small device you throw in the air and use to view the surrounding area, to the ubiquitous Predator and the intelligence and the imagery that comes from the strategic-level UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles). In my time in Afghanistan, I saw drone use progress from the early part of the decade when there was very limited reliance on drones at the tactical operational level to now when almost every squad leader demands to have one.
In 2005, drones were a rare commodity, particularly in Afghanistan. This is because they were being fielded in Iraq as fast as they could be deployed. Back then, the only time we had drones was for what we call a TIC, a “troops in contact” situation. There was only a small Coalition (Forces) presence in the south then and we were very isolated, far from any type of support. We were using drones as kind of a force protection, a mode of survival.
It was not until 2009 and 2010 that we had enough assets to use drones for what we call “pattern of life” operations, continuously watching certain areas day and night until a certain event led to night raids to capture insurgent leaders. Even then there was a constant competition between military headquarters for who was able to use those assets. If we were lucky we would get drone coverage for a day or a day and a half at most.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Drone WarsTransforming Conflict, Law, and Policy, pp. 209 - 214Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014