If conflict is an intrinsic feature of democratic politics, then the manifestations of this conflict should be subjected to critical analysis to assess the extent to which they lend themselves to violence. This is particularly important because modern politics – especially in pious democratic forms – tends to deal with these conflicts in ethical terms constructed on a juxtaposition between democracy and violence. For this reason, evaluation of the ethics of conflict is fundamental to the arguments for and against democracy in contemporary politics, in particular the relationship between violence and democracy. Rather than seeing democracy and violence as contrasting concepts, this chapter argues that democratic societies have always been founded on the basis of violent engagement at some level and that pejorative ethical judgements on the negativity of violence are therefore problematic. Of course, as Max Weber made clear, the modern state has always claimed the legitimate use of force as a key element in its authority. The chapter contends, however, that many contemporary democratic discourses have lost sight of this close relationship between democracy and violence. Indeed, it is frequently the case that discourses of democracy are couched in ethical terms as the obverse of violence. Ironically, this trend is often most apparent where societies are either making a transition to democracy or where a process of conflict transformation is taking place. The major contention is that such a simplistic juxtaposition of democracy and violence is essential to democratic piety, as it is an approach that glosses over the perpetration of violence in the name of democracy and, indeed, the importance of violent means as a potential tool of democratic regimes.