Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of abbreviations
- About the authors
- Acknowledgements
- Series preface
- 1 Framing welfare conditionality
- 2 Why Income Management?
- 3 Barriers to implementing Compulsory Income Management
- 4 Identity and emotion
- 5 Procedural, consumer and contractual rights, and access to justice
- 6 Resistance and reform: individual and collective agency
- 7 Voluntary Income Management and financial education
- 8 Recalibrating social security and reimagining work
- References
- Index
3 - Barriers to implementing Compulsory Income Management
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 October 2022
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of abbreviations
- About the authors
- Acknowledgements
- Series preface
- 1 Framing welfare conditionality
- 2 Why Income Management?
- 3 Barriers to implementing Compulsory Income Management
- 4 Identity and emotion
- 5 Procedural, consumer and contractual rights, and access to justice
- 6 Resistance and reform: individual and collective agency
- 7 Voluntary Income Management and financial education
- 8 Recalibrating social security and reimagining work
- References
- Index
Summary
Introduction
This chapter examines multiple barriers to the effective implementation of CIM programmes in Australia and New Zealand. Drawing on the views of Australian CIM participants and community stakeholders, this chapter argues that these implementation problems resulted from design and process flaws that could have been avoided if governments had given themselves genuine opportunities to listen to the needs of those individuals and communities impacted by CIM and had learned from research evidence. The first part of this chapter examines the impact of the top-down imposition of CIM on local communities in Australia. A major source of contention in trial sites has been the poor application of the chosen technology (whether the BasicsCard or Cashless Debit Card) without adequate regard to the needs or concerns of participants. Another source of conflict has been that so-called ‘consultation’ in specific geographical areas has been done with at best limited input from and consent of local communities, including IM participants. The limitations of government community consultation processes have had an adverse effect on community cohesion.
The second part of the chapter turns to New Zealand, where there was never any question that CIM was a top-down policy but where Youth Service mentors are meant to empower young people while at the same time tracking and surveilling their behaviour. This policy design causes considerable role confusion and frustration. Systems failures also mean the process of decision-making is lengthy and inconsistent, while technological failures created problems for both Youth Service providers and YP/ YPP recipients.
The third part discusses how things would have looked had co-design processes been employed to further community and youth development goals. The chapter concludes that the evidence around implementation furthers the argument that the introduction of CIM was ideologically driven.
Implementation problems in Australia
Application of technology without consumer input
As noted in Chapter 2, the Australian Government introduced CIM via two forms of debit card: the BasicsCard, introduced in the Northern Territory and then in multiple sites across Australia, including Playford and Greater Shepparton, where data were collected; and the Cashless Debit Card (CDC), later introduced in four sites for use at all stores.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Compulsory Income Management in Australia and New ZealandMore Harm than Good?, pp. 46 - 73Publisher: Bristol University PressPrint publication year: 2022