Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- 9 The Greek decision: the background
- 10 Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 11 The chiefs of staff at home and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 12 The Middle East command and the Greek decision
- 13 The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
12 - The Middle East command and the Greek decision
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- 9 The Greek decision: the background
- 10 Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 11 The chiefs of staff at home and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 12 The Middle East command and the Greek decision
- 13 The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Wavell
Wavell's plans were for the desert, not the Balkans or Turkey. He hoped to exploit his success now that the Italians were on the run. He wanted to extend operations to Tobruk and perhaps on to Benghazi. He might go as far as Tripoli, though that would tie up his forces in North Africa to the exclusion of their fighting elsewhere. At first, he was filled with dismay about the instructions to divert to Greece, which would neither help the Greeks nor stop the Germans, if they came, which in any case they might not. He did not, however, refuse to divert, though he thought a Greek refusal should be accepted; and he intended to warn the Greeks that if they refused there might be nothing for them later. As for Turkey, he did not think she would accept the offer, which would seem a mere drop in the ocean. Once Eden and Dill arrived he abandoned what remained of his opposition to diverting.
Wavell intended to extend his operations to Tobruk, and perhaps Benghazi; and, while the Italians were on the run, to exploit his success. In early January he planned ‘to move on to Tobruk’ as soon as Bardia had been ‘mopped up’ and investigate an advance from Tobruk towards Benghazi. Reluctant to curtail his successful Libyan advance (or abandon his Sudan offensive) he thought they must ‘continue … advance in Cyrenaica while [they had] the Italians on the run’.
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- Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940–1941 , pp. 206 - 218Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994