Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- 5 Churchill and the Middle East
- 6 Eden and the Middle East
- 7 Halifax and the Middle East
- 8 The military and the Middle East
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - Halifax and the Middle East
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- 5 Churchill and the Middle East
- 6 Eden and the Middle East
- 7 Halifax and the Middle East
- 8 The military and the Middle East
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The background: May–September 1940
Halifax anticipated some trouble, some time, in the Balkans – where Greece should be bolstered ·· and in the Middle East, where the Germans would pose the serious threat.
In the Balkans, the Greeks should be stiffened against an Italian attack – with promises of financial support and of bombing raids on Italy. Halifax did not think, by early September, such an attack would necessarily be immediate. Although Metaxas – who seemed to be ‘taking a firm attitude’ – could not be further pressed ‘to intensify … precautionary defence measures’, Halifax thought some promises might be made. The minister in Athens suggested military and financial help and Halifax thought they should promise ‘more intensive bombing of military targets in Italy … [and] should be ready to consider financial help’ – to which the cabinet agreed, as it also did to investigate operating bombers from Greek aerodromes. As to the Middle East, the impression Halifax had from Wavell was that ‘provided the Italian forces were engaged, he was not too unhappy about the position’ – but would regard German armoured reinforcements as constituting a ‘serious’ position. Indeed, if invasion were ‘off’, it was thought by Cadogan that Hitler would ‘have a winter campaign in North Africa and send a couple of thousand planes to help the Italians’ – though Halifax maintained that Germany and Italy ‘seemed to want to keep out of the war as long as they can’.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940–1941 , pp. 145 - 152Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994