Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- 9 The Greek decision: the background
- 10 Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 11 The chiefs of staff at home and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 12 The Middle East command and the Greek decision
- 13 The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
13 - The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- 9 The Greek decision: the background
- 10 Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 11 The chiefs of staff at home and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 12 The Middle East command and the Greek decision
- 13 The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Eden, Dill and the Middle East command
When Eden and Dill reached Cairo the earlier reluctance of the command to divert to Greece had, then, become acquiescence – partly because such a course appeared inevitable. The commanders by then believed that help to Greece had been settled; and that it was their duty to make the best possible arrangements. Eden, who himself was clear on the question of priority to Greece, was to report that he found considerable unanimity. Such unanimity did not, however, reflect the absence of doubts or reservations. But it may have been helped by Eden's not underestimating the professional difficulties – and by his having been privy to the early first objection of the command to diverting the previous November, after the Italian attack. Within two days of Eden's arrival, a clear plan, agreed with the Greeks, was reached. It was resolved, in Athens on 22 February, that the British and Greeks would stand, jointly, on the Aliakmon line.
Eden had arrived, therefore, in Cairo determined to succour the Greeks and somewhat relieved to find the commanders preparing to do so. But he quickly came to see Greece as an end in itself, accepting the prospect of defeat and the possibility that intervention might not necessarily have the desired effect on the Turks. Although clear that the Greeks should come first, the aim, or object, was less clear and the view of Greece as a means to bolster Turkey came to give way to the view of Greece as an end in itself.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940–1941 , pp. 219 - 256Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994