Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- 9 The Greek decision: the background
- 10 Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 11 The chiefs of staff at home and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 12 The Middle East command and the Greek decision
- 13 The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- 9 The Greek decision: the background
- 10 Churchill, Eden and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 11 The chiefs of staff at home and the Greek decision, January to 10 February 1941
- 12 The Middle East command and the Greek decision
- 13 The Greek decision, 10th February to early March 1941
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Churchill: the case for supporting Greece
Churchill's stand for the Greeks seemed, by early December, to be somewhat superseded by his advocacy of Wavell's desert campaign. His exhortations to Wavell to press on and his delight in the early victories made it seem that enthusiasm for Greece had given way to priority for Libya. But in the aftermath of the Libyan victories, Churchill's attention once more switched to Greece. Prompted by the prospect of Hitler's turning on the Balkans and a German descent on Salonika via Greece, by the need to stop Hitler and prevent the Greeks making a separate peace, by the implications of Greek resistance for Turkey and for the other Balkan countries, he began to advocate that the Libyan campaign should now take second place. He pressed for preparations to prevent a German move on Salonika; and warned of the dangerous implications not only for Greece, but for other Balkan countries, Turkey, and the whole Middle East position.
On 6 January Churchill raised the prospect of reinforcements for the Greeks – four or five more squadrons and possibly part of the 2nd armoured division. He anticipated that Longmore's airmen, who must be remounted upon the best machines, ‘might soon have to operate in Greece and in Turkey against the Germans’. Eden's warning of a German descent coming after Wavell's victories may have led to the feeling that more could now be done in Albania, if not in Greece and Turkey, than in Libya; to the view that the campaign in Libya ‘must now take second place’; and to Churchill's instructions to consider ‘further assistance to Greece’.
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- Information
- Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940–1941 , pp. 176 - 190Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994