Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- 1 The opposition to Churchill and its causes
- 2 Events and reactions – (1): The German attack on France and its aftermath
- 3 Events and reactions – (2): The Battle of Britain
- 4 Chamberlain, Churchill and the conservative party
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Chamberlain, Churchill and the conservative party
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- Retrospect
- Part 1 Churchill, the conservative party and the war
- 1 The opposition to Churchill and its causes
- 2 Events and reactions – (1): The German attack on France and its aftermath
- 3 Events and reactions – (2): The Battle of Britain
- 4 Chamberlain, Churchill and the conservative party
- Part 2 The Middle East, imperial defence and the Balkans (October to December 1940)
- Part 3 The Greek Decision (January to March 1941)
- General conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
It was not only by his reaction to events in France and to the battle of Britain that Churchill changed the view of himself, and overcame the opposition, particularly amongst the conservatives, and prevented a split in the party. He also did so by balancing his own manipulation of the feeling against Chamberlain (amongst rebel tories, the labour party, independent members and Lloyd George) with meticulous displays of loyalty to Chamberlain and affection for him. He had, at the outset, ensured that no evidence of intrigues or schemes on his part existed.
The campaign against Chamberlain: critics and criticisms
Although Churchill had no apparent connection with those whose interventions against Chamberlain had helped to bring him to power – he did not seem to lead them or their rebellion – he nonetheless appeared to command influence with them as well as having benefited from their actions. Nor did he dissociate from them; but, rather they received office or it was proposed to them; and they continued to demand that Chamberlain be removed from the government – a demand which Churchill did not meet, but did not prevent from being made. Churchill derived political advantage from the campaign against Chamberlain and, though he deprecated publicly attempts to find a scapegoat, he earned enormous personal benefit from the search. Moreover, he formulated his own interpretation of recent events and their cause in the terms of Chamberlain's critics: Chamberlain was held responsible for the war and the disasters: he had failed to stop Hitler or to prepare before or after the war.
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- Information
- Churchill and the Politics of War, 1940–1941 , pp. 88 - 112Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1994