As mentioned in Chapter , the lack of a universal alignment framework seriously complicates the empirical assessment of interstate strategic cooperation. Even the definitions of a more conventional term – “alliance” – vary in terms of comprehensiveness and precision. According to Walt (1987, p. 1), both “formal” and “informal” relationships of security cooperation between sovereign states qualify as an alliance. Weitsman (2003, p. 7) provides an even broader definition according to which alliances are agreements that simply provide “some element of security” to the participants. Snyder (1997, p. 4) defines alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership.” The emphasis on formality (formal treaties) as an attribute of alliances helps to narrow down the definition significantly, but it excludes a range of important and strategically consequential informal alignments.

The alignment framework offered in this book begins with the assumption that alignment formation is a stadial process in the sense that the development of a functioning alignment takes time, and interstate strategic cooperation must pass an early and a moderate stage before it moves into an advanced stage and, hence, a tighter alignment. States are not likely to become closely aligned overnight. While they may rush into a bonding alliance treaty in response to an external threat or shock, the actual functionality of such an alliance, as well as the compatibility and interoperability of the allies’ military forces, is likely to be questionable, unless the actors involved have already had a history of comprehensive strategic cooperation.