Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-l4dxg Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-15T00:29:42.075Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

175. - Striving

from S

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Get access

Summary

The doctrine of striving (conatus) as our “actual essence” forms the metaphysical basis for Spinoza’s ethical project. Near the start of the third part of the Ethics, Spinoza articulates the doctrine: “Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being [in suo esse perseverare conatur]” (E3p6, alt. trans.). The view that animate things naturally strive to preserve themselves had for centuries been part and parcel of Western philosophy, in particular through the teachings of Stoics, for whom the impulse (hormê) to self-preservation forms the basis of a naturalistic ethics. Still, the intellectual landscape had altered by Spinoza’s time in a radical way under the influence of the new mechanical sciences, undermining the teleological understanding of the way in which the world and things in it were ordered. In brief, naturalistic ethics had to be rethought given that it could no longer accommodate the traditional idea of ends.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Recommended Reading

Carriero, J. (2005). Spinoza on final causality. Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 2, 105–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Della Rocca, M. (2022). Spinoza’s metaphysical psychology. In Garrett, D. (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 2nd edn (pp. 234–81). Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Garrett, D. (2002). Spinoza’s conatus argument. In Koistinen, O. and Biro, J. (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes (pp. 127–58). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hübner, K. (2018). Spinoza’s unorthodox metaphysics of the will. In Della Rocca, M., The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza (pp. 343–68). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Viljanen, V. (2011). Spinoza’s Geometry of Power. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 4–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Viljanen, V. (2015). Spinoza’s essentialism in the Short Treatise. In Melamed, Y. (ed.), The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making (pp. 183–95). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×