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126. - Modality

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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The necessity (necessitas) of all things is one of the most distinctive features of Spinoza’s philosophy. For those opposed to Spinoza it is, along with the treatment of God, its most notorious feature. In the Ethics, it is proclaimed and explained in various places. One main point is that God, the only substance, exists necessarily (E1p7d, E1p11). A second main point is that nothing exists apart from God and what is is conceived through God (E1p14–15), but what is conceived through God “follows [sequi]” from God: “From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes, (i.e., everything which can fall under an infinite intellect)” (E1p16). In this passage, the scope of the “everything” characterizing what falls under the infinite intellect seems to be everything without qualification, leaving no room for anything to not follow from God. Moreover, God is the cause of everything (E1p16c1), and E1a3 tells us, “From a given determinate cause the effect follows necessarily; and conversely, if there is no determinate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow” (emphasis added).

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Bennett, J. (1984). A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Hackett.Google Scholar
Curley, E. M. (1969). Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation. Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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Garrett, D. (2018). Spinoza’s necessitarianism (with Postscript). In Garrett, , Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy (pp. 98148). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hübner, K. (2015a). Spinoza on essences, universals, and beings of reason. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 96(2), 5888.Google Scholar
Hübner, K. (2015b). On the significance of formal causes in Spinoza’s philosophy. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 97(2), 196233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Leibniz, G. W. (1989). Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. Ariew, R. and Garber, D.. Hackett.Google Scholar
Nelson, A. (2017). Logic and knowledge. In Kaufman, D. (ed.). The Routledge Companion to Seventeenth Century Philosophy (pp. 224–49). Routledge.Google Scholar
Schliesser, E. (2018). Spinoza and the philosophy of science. In Della Rocca, M. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza (pp. 155–89). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Shein, N. (2020). Spinning strands into aspects: Realism, idealism, and finite modes in Spinoza. European Journal of Philosophy, 28, 323–36.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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