After the sophistication of medieval discussions of language, Spinoza’s treatment of the topic is in some ways certainly a disappointment. Prima facie, all he offers are scattered remarks about the philosophical insignificance of words, and indeed the outright hazard words pose for someone interested in truth. For example, Spinoza dismisses certain philosophical errors as “only words for which [the speakers] have no idea” (E2p35s), and asserts that his own “purpose is to explain the nature of things, not the meaning of words [verborum significationem]” (E3DA20exp). This dismissive attitude toward language might perhaps be expected, given that Spinoza classifies cognition “from signs [signis], e.g., from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect things, and form certain ideas of them,” as part of the lowest kind of cognition, mere “opinion or imagination” (E2p40s2). As Moreau notes, so understood, Spinoza participates in a widespread early modern tendency toward denigration of language, shared inter alia by Bacon and many Cartesians (2021, 320).