The concept of utility does not play a fundamental role in justice as fairness. Where other theories, most notably utilitarianism, rely on utility, justice as fairness relies on primary goods. It does so in two related places: the motivation of the parties in the original position and the content of the principles.

Rawls distinguishes “classic utilitarianism” from “average utilitarianism.” The former is a teleological theory which requires the maximization of aggregate utility. Average utilitarianism, in contrast, “directs society to maximize not the total but the average utility (per capita)” (TJ 140). While Rawls associates classical utilitarianism with the idea of a “rational and impartial sympathetic spectator,” he argues that average utilitarianism would be chosen by an individual in an initial choice situation similar but not identical to the original position. The justifications of these two forms of utilitarianism, he holds, are quite different: “while the average principle of utility is the ethic of a single rational individual (with no aversion to risk) who tries to maximize his own prospects, the classical doctrine is the ethic of perfect altruists” (TJ 164–165).