As Rawls defines it, “intuitionism” is the doctrine that holds that there is “a plurality of first principles which may conflict to give contrary directives in particular cases,” and that there is “no explicit method, no priority rules, for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to strike a balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right” (TJ 30). Our pre-philosophical moral sense is intuitionistic, as we rely on “groups of rather specific precepts, each group applying to a particular problem of justice” (TJ 31). We use these various common-sense precepts intuitively to determine things like a fair wage, just taxation, and appropriate punishments. Justice as fairness holds that since an intuitionistic theory does not assign weights to its various precepts, it is “but half a conception” (TJ 37). On the other hand, because justice as fairness aims to describe our moral sense in reflective equilibrium, and because the various precepts are intuitively plausible, Rawls wants to explain how justice as fairness captures their plausibility, even if none can properly be elevated to the position of the sole standard of justice.