Book contents
- Frontmatter
- 1 The Canvas and the Prism
- 2 The Birth of American Diplomacy
- 3 The Constitution
- 4 Federalist Diplomacy: Realism and Anglophilia
- 5 Jefferson and Madison: The Diplomacy of Fear and Hope
- 6 To the Monroe Doctrine
- 7 Manifest Destiny
- 8 Britain, Canada, and the United States
- 9 The Republican Empire
- Bibliographic Essay
- Index
- THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
- References
6 - To the Monroe Doctrine
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2008
- Frontmatter
- 1 The Canvas and the Prism
- 2 The Birth of American Diplomacy
- 3 The Constitution
- 4 Federalist Diplomacy: Realism and Anglophilia
- 5 Jefferson and Madison: The Diplomacy of Fear and Hope
- 6 To the Monroe Doctrine
- 7 Manifest Destiny
- 8 Britain, Canada, and the United States
- 9 The Republican Empire
- Bibliographic Essay
- Index
- THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
- References
Summary
Like most American wars, the War of 1812 was not followed by a period of reponse, but rather by one of nationalism, here marked by efforts to foster American trade, expand territorially, and develop influence in parts of the hemisphere previously of little concern. These endeavors culminated in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. In his annual message of that year, President James Monroe asserted principles that, though not shouted to the world, had often influenced and even guided his predecessors. By giving public expression to these themes, he proclaimed a policy of diplomatic independence stronger than any his predecessors had dared.
At the very beginning of the period, in 1815, there occurred an incident that, though substantively trivial, expressed the new spirit. Monroe, still secretary of state, directed negotiators of a commercial convention with England to insist upon the principle of the alternat. By this principle, when major states made treaties, the name of each alternately took precedence in the text and, on the signture page of the copy it was to keep, each delegation signed on the preferred left hand side. Although partially followed in Pinckney’s Treaty with Spain and completely in the Louisiana agreements, most American treaties, including those ending the Revolution and the Wars of 1812, did not follow the alternat – Europeans took precendence. Monroe considered this demeaning, as did John Quincy Adams, one of the negotiators at London. Adam’s colleagues, Henry Clay and Albert Gallatin, were prepared to ignore their instructions and Adams’s opinion, but he thought them around by a threat to with hold his signature from the convention.
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- Information
- The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations , pp. 147 - 169Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1993