Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 The Myth of a Paper Fleet
- 2 Government and the Navy
- 3 ‘Treating the House with Contempt’: British Naval Finance in the Eighteenth Century
- 4 Crisis and Victory: The Navy, 1714–62
- 5 The Peace Establishment I: Demobilization and Retrenchment, 1763–6
- 6 The Peace Establishment II: Stability, Innovation, and the Falklands, 1766–70
- 7 Sandwich, Parliament and the Paper Fleet, 1771–9
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Extraordinary Estimates 1750–76
- Appendix 2 Extraordinary Estimate, Navy Office, 2 February 1767
- Appendix 3 Estimate of Monies Needed (ADM B 177, 5 August 1765)
- Appendix 4 ‘Plan of Expense of His Majesty’s Navy for the Year 1768’ (ADM B 181, 27 May 1768)
- Appendix 5 Account of the Course of the Navy (Fragment, ADM B 183, 6 August 1770)
- Appendix 6 A List of the Ships of the Royal Navy, 1 January 1763, with the Condition of the Navy on Survey (ADM 7 553)
- Appendix 7 British Battlefleet 1714–80
- Appendix 8 Environmental Impact on the Navy’s Ships, 1710–80
- Appendix 9 Naval Finance and Expenditure
- Appendix 10 The Procedure for Voting a Supply to the Navy
- Bibliography
- Index
Foreword
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 March 2023
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 The Myth of a Paper Fleet
- 2 Government and the Navy
- 3 ‘Treating the House with Contempt’: British Naval Finance in the Eighteenth Century
- 4 Crisis and Victory: The Navy, 1714–62
- 5 The Peace Establishment I: Demobilization and Retrenchment, 1763–6
- 6 The Peace Establishment II: Stability, Innovation, and the Falklands, 1766–70
- 7 Sandwich, Parliament and the Paper Fleet, 1771–9
- 8 Conclusion
- Appendix 1 Extraordinary Estimates 1750–76
- Appendix 2 Extraordinary Estimate, Navy Office, 2 February 1767
- Appendix 3 Estimate of Monies Needed (ADM B 177, 5 August 1765)
- Appendix 4 ‘Plan of Expense of His Majesty’s Navy for the Year 1768’ (ADM B 181, 27 May 1768)
- Appendix 5 Account of the Course of the Navy (Fragment, ADM B 183, 6 August 1770)
- Appendix 6 A List of the Ships of the Royal Navy, 1 January 1763, with the Condition of the Navy on Survey (ADM 7 553)
- Appendix 7 British Battlefleet 1714–80
- Appendix 8 Environmental Impact on the Navy’s Ships, 1710–80
- Appendix 9 Naval Finance and Expenditure
- Appendix 10 The Procedure for Voting a Supply to the Navy
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
When France joined the American Revolutionary War in 1778 the British Navy was far from ready. A year later Spain joined the contest, rendering the situation truly grim because both Bourbon powers had been strenuously building up their navies. Lord Sandwich, First Lord of the Admiralty, told Parliament in early December 1777 that the fleet was more than a match for the Bourbon combination, but this declaration stood in marked contrast to his private assessment. For more than a year he had been beseeching Lord North for authorization to increase the number of British ships in commission. Reliable intelligence indicated that France was preparing new warships at such a pace that she would enjoy a substantial initial advantage if war came. The North administration had been hoping to knock the American rebellion off its feet by a massive military assault and had chosen not to augment the British fleet at home both to save money and to avoid antagonizing France. This strategy failed, and at the beginning of 1778, seeing that France would probably take advantage of the situation, North wanted to resign and proposed that the British government should settle its differences with the Americans. By then the Americans knew that France intended war, and when it was declared Britain faced a naval crisis.
It had two aspects. Most immediately, there was the amount of time required to mobilize, that is to make the ships in reserve ready for active service and find men for them. In the opening phase of every war the manning problem posed enormous difficulties for the British Navy while the French Navy, thanks to a registry system, was able to get its ships manned faster. The other aspect concerned the condition of the ships in reserve. In truth, the Navy list contained many which would require major repairs or should be replaced by new construction. Although new ships could be, and were, ordered to be built in merchants’ yards, two or three years would pass before they could sail and fight. In the meantime the shortage would prevent the Admiralty from adopting optimum modes of naval strategy. To the consternation of the British public, French naval operations proceeded with little hindrance.
This book concerns the second problem, the lack of ships. How could such inferiority have been allowed to develop?
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- The British Navy and the State in the Eighteenth Century , pp. vi - viiiPublisher: Boydell & BrewerPrint publication year: 2004