Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The period of persuasion: British strategic foreign policy and Soviet Russia, 1919–1933
- 2 1933–1934: parallel interests?
- 3 A clash of sensibilities: January to June 1935
- 4 Complications and choices: July 1935–February 1936
- 5 Soviet Russian assertiveness: February 1936–July 1937
- 6 Chamberlain's interlude: May 1937–September 1938
- 7 Chamberlain as Buridan's ass: October 1938–September 1939
- Conclusion
- Appendix I
- Appendix II
- Appendix III
- Bibliography
- Index
4 - Complications and choices: July 1935–February 1936
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Introduction
- 1 The period of persuasion: British strategic foreign policy and Soviet Russia, 1919–1933
- 2 1933–1934: parallel interests?
- 3 A clash of sensibilities: January to June 1935
- 4 Complications and choices: July 1935–February 1936
- 5 Soviet Russian assertiveness: February 1936–July 1937
- 6 Chamberlain's interlude: May 1937–September 1938
- 7 Chamberlain as Buridan's ass: October 1938–September 1939
- Conclusion
- Appendix I
- Appendix II
- Appendix III
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
The period from the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement until the middle of February 1936 was difficult. In Europe, the Abyssinian crisis complicated matters for British defence planning. In the Far East, tensions remained high between Britain and Japan. These circumstances confronted Britain with difficult choices about the direction of its strategic foreign policy. The ‘deterrence’ period had not yet produced any neat answers for British policy makers. Soviet Russia was important in both Europe and the Far East. In Europe, the major discussions centred round whether German desires could (or should) be accommodated (possibly at the indirect expense of Moscow) or whether they could (or should) be opposed (possibly by means of an alliance with Moscow). In the Far East, the contentious point was whether British interests would best be protected by means of an Anglo-Japanese agreement (at the risk of alienating Soviet Russia, the United States and China) or by the more tenuous means of utilizing the common interest shared by London, Moscow and Washington to check Japan. These sets of decisions were linked: first, by the facts that both Soviet Russia and Britain had interests in both regions, and that the two decisions thus had to be consonant with one another; second, by the fact that Soviet Russia had strategic foreign-policy options, and was by no means a passive player in this process.
It is important to note that major political changes had occurred in London. Early in June, MacDonald resigned and was succeeded by Baldwin.
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005