INTRODUCTION

ADMIRAL KATŌ HIROHARU (sometimes Kanji), who liked England and enjoyed the company of English people in his younger years, gradually turned against Britain for understandable professional reasons and as a result of lifetime experiences. By the 1920s Katō appears to have placed Japan's naval interests, especially in the controversial context of naval limitation which Britain was promoting, ahead of any residual affection he had for that country. This essay deals with the early part of his career when he admired Britain and was able to play a significant role in Anglo-Japanese cooperation.

Katō Hiroharu (1870–1939) was born in Fukui city, a city in central Japan which provided the Imperial Japanese Navy with many prominent officers. His family which was of naval stock moved to Tokyo when he was six. After basic education there, Hiroharu entered the naval academy (kaigun heigakkō.) at Etajima in 1882. Graduating in 1891, he was evidently highly thought of and was sent in 1900 to St Petersburg where he picked up a good knowledge of Russian and made valuable contacts. He served during the Russo- Japanese War on board the flagship of Admiral Tōgō, the Mikasa. He was in charge of gunnery and this continued to be his specialism. He emerged from the war with a high reputation and became a sort of aide to Admiral Yamamoto Gombei, who had served as navy minister throughout the war and then resigned. When Yamamoto was chosen to join the Imperial Thanksgiving Mission to Britain in 1907, it was natural that Katō should be invited to join the Japanese naval team.

The 1907 mission was in part a symbol of the ‘special relationship’ between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy. The latter felt a new confidence after their naval success at the battle of Tsushima (1905) and felt that their victory was more spectacular than the performance of the Chōshū-dominated army in the land war. The leaders of the navy, feeling that their service had been held back during the Meiji period, wanted to capitalize on its success. They proposed a long-term plan for an 8–8 fleet, which envisaged the building of eight battleships and eight heavy cruisers.