This book has discussed the question of the function of, and the need for, art in society, by means of a systematic comparison between the aesthetic theories of Walter Benjamin and Theodor W. Adorno. As soon as we see the major similarities between their theories, the differences, however subtle, also come to light. I will not repeat all the specific differences discussed in the conclusions of the separate chapters, but will restrict myself to what I consider the three most important ones. These concern the role of subjectivity, the meaning of truth, and the difference between hope and promise. Next, we will turn to the question of the ‘actuality’ of their theories.

‘A distance, however close’

Many theorists have argued that Benjamin attempts to eliminate subjectivity from his philosophy, while Adorno desperately holds onto it. In fact, as we have seen, it was Adorno himself who was the first to point to this difference in his essay on Benjamin. However, this distinction cannot be made as sharply as Adorno and other theorists have claimed. Benjamin's philosophy, in all its facets – aesthetics, theory of criticism, theory of experience, and philosophy of history – does in fact allow room for, and even presupposes, subjectivity. The experience of the aura supposes a relation of transformation and reciprocity between an object and its observer; in this regard, it is indeed quite similar to Adorno's concept of mimesis, which also presumes a subject who is both receptive and creative. The theory of art criticism, although revolving around the Romantic idea of the auto-critique of the artwork, still presumes a critical subject who first sets in motion this auto-critique. Even Benjamin's method of historiography, according to which he claims to have ‘nothing to say, only to show’, presumes the presence of the subject. The ‘historical materialist’, as Benjamin calls his historian, is to construct a constellation of material on which their image of history will depend. Obviously, the kind of subjectivity Benjamin has in mind is quite different from traditional philosophical subjectivity. His subject – as historian, critic, or ‘collector’ – is a distracted one.