Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Contents
- List of Photographs
- List of maps
- List of Charts
- Acknowledgements
- List of contributors
- Abbreviations
- Codenames
- Chronology
- Military symbols on maps
- Military History and 1943: A Perspective 70 Years on
- Part 1 Strategy in 1943
- Part 2 US Operations
- Part 3 From Sea and Sky: the RAN and the RAAF
- Part 4 The Australian Role in Cartwheel
- 7 Logistics and the Cartwheel Operations
- 8 The ‘Salamaua Magnet’
- 9 From the Air, Sea and Land
- 10 Operations in the Markham and Ramu Valleys
- 11 Applying the Principles of War
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
7 - Logistics and the Cartwheel Operations
from Part 4 - The Australian Role in Cartwheel
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2013
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Foreword
- Contents
- List of Photographs
- List of maps
- List of Charts
- Acknowledgements
- List of contributors
- Abbreviations
- Codenames
- Chronology
- Military symbols on maps
- Military History and 1943: A Perspective 70 Years on
- Part 1 Strategy in 1943
- Part 2 US Operations
- Part 3 From Sea and Sky: the RAN and the RAAF
- Part 4 The Australian Role in Cartwheel
- 7 Logistics and the Cartwheel Operations
- 8 The ‘Salamaua Magnet’
- 9 From the Air, Sea and Land
- 10 Operations in the Markham and Ramu Valleys
- 11 Applying the Principles of War
- Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
‘The great problem of warfare in the Pacific’, General MacArthur declared, ‘is to move forces into contact and maintain them. Victory is dependent upon solution to the logistic problem’.
Shipping
Since New Guinea is made up of islands, and the capacity of air transport was limited, troops and supplies had to travel by ship in the first instance. Due to the large distances involved, the support of a US serviceman in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) required roughly twice as many ships as it did in the European theatre of operations. To economise on shipping, US forces drew on Australian sources of supply as much as possible. In no other theatre was reciprocal aid to the United States so important.
Containerisation of shipping lay in the future so most shipments were break-bulk dry cargo. This consisted of discrete items packed in boxes, crates and bags that had to be individually handled, as opposed to bulk cargo, which refers to commodities that are loaded continuously without packaging or sorting, such as coal or wheat. This allowed ships to be unloaded with their own tackle where there were no special port facilities, but was slow and manpower intensive. Attempts to load ships efficiently tended to result in long unloading times, and urgently required goods being over-stowed with other cargo. While there was a global shortage of shipping, the real problem in the SWPA was an acute shortage of port capacity.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Australia 1943The Liberation of New Guinea, pp. 167 - 185Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2013