Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- PART ONE INTRODUCTION AND THEORY
- PART TWO THE SITUATIONS
- Single-Component Patterns
- Two- and Three-Component Patterns
- Entry #5 The Prisoner's Dilemma: Me versus We
- Entry #6 Threat: Trading Loyalty for Justice
- Entry #7 Chicken: Death before Dishonor
- Entry #8 Hero: Let's Do It Your Way
- Entry #9 Conjunctive Problems: Together We Can Do It
- Entry #10 Disjunctive Problems: Either of Us Can Do It
- Entry #11 Asymmetric Dependence: You're the Boss
- Time-Extended Patterns
- Incomplete Information Situations
- N-Person Situations
- Movement from One Situation to Another
- PART THREE EPILOGUE
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Entry #6 - Threat: Trading Loyalty for Justice
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2009
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- PART ONE INTRODUCTION AND THEORY
- PART TWO THE SITUATIONS
- Single-Component Patterns
- Two- and Three-Component Patterns
- Entry #5 The Prisoner's Dilemma: Me versus We
- Entry #6 Threat: Trading Loyalty for Justice
- Entry #7 Chicken: Death before Dishonor
- Entry #8 Hero: Let's Do It Your Way
- Entry #9 Conjunctive Problems: Together We Can Do It
- Entry #10 Disjunctive Problems: Either of Us Can Do It
- Entry #11 Asymmetric Dependence: You're the Boss
- Time-Extended Patterns
- Incomplete Information Situations
- N-Person Situations
- Movement from One Situation to Another
- PART THREE EPILOGUE
- References
- Author Index
- Subject Index
Summary
Examples
In this situation, one person has control over how the outcomes resulting from the pair's joint activities are divided between them. If that person exploits his or her power, taking for himself or herself the lion's share of those outcomes, the partner's only (ultimate) recourse is to refuse to continue in the joint activities. For example, when an older and younger brother play “cops and robbers,” the older one may be able to determine the enjoyment each gets from the game by assigning the roles and controlling who gets to use the available toys. However, neither will gain any satisfaction from the game unless both play. If the older boy takes the choice roles and the preferred equipment, the younger boy must either accept the unfair allocation or threaten to refuse to play the game with enthusiasm or to continue it at all. It is the weaker person's “threat” in this scenario from which this situation takes its name. In general, this situation gives rise to the problem of managing an exchange of “justice” for “loyalty,” one partner's just allocations being made in return for the other partner's loyalty in supporting their joint activities.
The structure and dynamics of this situation are common in various types of relationships and settings. For instance, a supervisor may have the power to determine how important job resources, such as office space and funds for computing, are split between her and a subordinate.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- An Atlas of Interpersonal Situations , pp. 192 - 202Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2003