Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction: “A City upon a Hill”
- PART ONE THE ORIGINS OF THE SECURITY ETHOS, 1688–1919
- PART TWO INTERNATIONALISM AND CONTAINMENT, 1919–1973
- PART THREE THE AGE OF STRATEGIC GLOBALISM, 1973–2001
- 6 Core Values and Strategic Globalism through 1988
- 7 The False Promise of a New World Order
- 8 Globalization and Militarism
- PART FOUR THE BUSH DOCTRINE
- Conclusion: The Security Ethos and Civic Virtue
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- References
7 - The False Promise of a New World Order
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction: “A City upon a Hill”
- PART ONE THE ORIGINS OF THE SECURITY ETHOS, 1688–1919
- PART TWO INTERNATIONALISM AND CONTAINMENT, 1919–1973
- PART THREE THE AGE OF STRATEGIC GLOBALISM, 1973–2001
- 6 Core Values and Strategic Globalism through 1988
- 7 The False Promise of a New World Order
- 8 Globalization and Militarism
- PART FOUR THE BUSH DOCTRINE
- Conclusion: The Security Ethos and Civic Virtue
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
What is at stake…is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.
George H. W. Bush, 1991Like George Bush, I was of a generation that embraced wholeheartedly the concept of a Pax Americana.
James A. Baker III, 1995When the Reagan phase of the Cold War ended with a weakened Soviet Union, the discourse about security among policymakers and defense intellectuals, inside the Washington Beltway and at think tanks and universities around the nation, sounded decidedly triumphalist. Protective as ever of his and Nixon's policies and mindful of their legacy, Henry Kissinger continued to chide the critics of détente, in effect refusing to admit that the very word had become anathema for political reasons. Meanwhile, the imperative to contain potential adversaries remained at the very heart of strategic thinking in America. In that respect, containment in some form might survive as a useful tactic even after the Soviet empire finally collapsed.
The Carter and Reagan administrations had accepted the contradictory premises underlying strategic globalism: The application of American power was limited, yet the responsibility to act as the guarantor of order was global in scope. Kissinger grudgingly celebrated Reagan's achievements vis-à-vis the Soviets, finding in the Californian's actual policies, as distinct from the bellicose rhetoric he had initially employed, vital continuities from his own years in power.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- National Security and Core Values in American History , pp. 203 - 226Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009