Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Pragmatism, categories, and language
- 2 The limits of reductionism
- 3 Realism, categories, and the “linguistic turn”
- 4 The subjectivist principle and the linguistic turn
- 5 Empiricism, extensionalism, and reductionism
- 6 Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories
- 7 Do analysts and metaphysicians disagree?
- 8 Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental
- 9 Wittgenstein, privileged access, and incommunicability
- 10 In defense of eliminative materialism
- 11 Cartesian epistemology and changes in ontology
- 12 Strawson’s objectivity argument
- 13 Verificationism and transcendental arguments
- 14 Indeterminacy of translation and of truth
- 15 Dennett on awareness
- 16 Functionalism, machines, and incorrigibility
- Index of names
- References
7 - Do analysts and metaphysicians disagree?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Pragmatism, categories, and language
- 2 The limits of reductionism
- 3 Realism, categories, and the “linguistic turn”
- 4 The subjectivist principle and the linguistic turn
- 5 Empiricism, extensionalism, and reductionism
- 6 Mind-body identity, privacy, and categories
- 7 Do analysts and metaphysicians disagree?
- 8 Incorrigibility as the mark of the mental
- 9 Wittgenstein, privileged access, and incommunicability
- 10 In defense of eliminative materialism
- 11 Cartesian epistemology and changes in ontology
- 12 Strawson’s objectivity argument
- 13 Verificationism and transcendental arguments
- 14 Indeterminacy of translation and of truth
- 15 Dennett on awareness
- 16 Functionalism, machines, and incorrigibility
- Index of names
- References
Summary
My title suggests that there are two well-defined schools of philosophers – the “analytic” and the “metaphysical.” I am aware of the sort of over-simplification which such labeling produces, but I think that it is sometimes justified. Despite the obvious differences between, say, Goodman, Wisdom, and Austin, and the equally obvious differences between Whitehead, Heidegger, and Maritain, some important metaphilosophical disagreements clearly exist between a position which is the least common denominator of the views of philosophers who have taken “the linguistic turn,” and a position which is the least common denominator of the views of those who have not. The labels “analyst” and “metaphysician” are at least brief, and using them is no more unfair to one side than to the other.
As my title also suggests, I find it very difficult to formulate these metaphilosophical disagreements. They are usually conceived as centering around a disagreement about what method to pursue. My principal thesis in this chapter will be that none of the familiar ways of characterizing such alternative methods are successful.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Mind, Language, and MetaphilosophyEarly Philosophical Papers, pp. 132 - 146Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2014
References
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